Fox River Grove Overview

     About 7:10 a.m., a commuter train struck a school bus at a highway/rail grade crossing. The train, according to the onboard event recorder, was travelling at about 59 miles per hour when it struck the left rear of the school bus. Of the 35 students on board the school bus, 7 were fatally injured, and 24 others received injuries varying from minor to critical. The bus driver also received minor injuries.

     The school bus driver told investigators that she stopped on the south side of the railroad tracks. While stopped, she opened the passenger-loading door, looked right, then left, then right again. At the point where she stopped the bus she was able to see the railroad tracks in both directions. She stated that she saw no activity in either direction. The traffic signal was red. The bus driver proceeded across the tracks and stopped at a point where the rear of the bus extended about 30 inches into the space required for passage of an eastbound commuter train. The bus driver stated that she was not aware that the rear of the school bus was extending into the train's space. She was a substitute driver and this was her first time on this route.

     The bus driver said that she did not hear the train whistle or the crossing bells. She did not see the flashing lights of the crossing or the crossing gates lowering. She did not hear the crossing gate striking the upper left side of the bus body or decipher any warnings of the train's approach from the student passengers in the back of the bus. The bus was equipped with a stereo system and a sound absorbing ceiling liner. The school bus driver told investigators that she never saw the train. At the time of the collision, she was still awaiting a green signal light that would allow her to make a left turn onto the highway.

     The investigation found no mechanical deficiencies with the school bus or railroad equipment.

     The bus driver involved in the accident was in charge of training for the school district. Although she had responsibility for training other drivers, the day of the accident she was a substitute and was unfamiliar with this particular run. The regular bus driver knew that there was inadequate room at the far side of the crossing for her bus and therefore never moved her bus across the grade crossing unless the light was green. The bus driver involved in the accident thought that she had to cross the tracks and trip a sensor before the signal would turn green and allow her to turn west. The regular bus driver was required to brief the substitute bus driver with any special information that she needed to complete the run. This briefing was to include safety information. It never took place.

     The railroad and the Department of Transportation were to coordinate the preemption of the signal at the road whenever a train tripped the crossing gates. Neither organization understood how the other organization was providing the preemption signals or using the preemption signals.

     The local police department had received several complaints about the operation of the road crossing. The police chief was at the intersection at the time of the accident, troubleshooting yet another complaint.

     In response to those complaints, signal maintenance personnel from both the railroad and the highway had been dispatched to monitor their respective signal's operation. The results of these site inspections had generally been that the signal system was working as designed. The Department of Transportation modified the area of the crossing by adding two additional lanes of traffic on the highway and shortening the traffic storage area for the light. No changes were made to the crossing even though the storage area had been reduced substantially.