Libyan Airliner Overview

     On February 21, 1973, Israeli fighter planes shot down a Libyan passenger airliner during a period of escalating tensions between the two countries.

     From the Israeli Perspective: At 1354 hours on February 21 during a sandstorm, an aircraft penetrating the war zone in the Sinai Desert was spotted on Israeli radar. The course that the unidentified plane used happened to be the hostile route the Egyptian fighters have used in their intrusions. Despite flying over the most sensitive spots of the Egyptian war zone, the Egyptians did not launch fighters to intercept the intruder or fire missiles. At 1356 hours, two Israeli fighters were sent to intercept the intruder, which they identified as a Libyan airliner. Libya is known to be a state that provides terrorists with means for their activities, so the fighters instructed the plane to land at the nearby Refidim air base by internationally practiced signals of signaling by radio and rocking the wings. The aircraft did not respond or establish radio communication, although the airliner pilot looked straight into one of the fighter pilot's eyes and signaled by hand that he understood the orders to land and would obey them. Nevertheless, the airliner continued its flight trajectory. At 1401 hours, the fighters fired shells in front of the plane, and the airliner turned toward the Refidim air base, descended to 5000 feet and lowered its landing gear. Then it suddenly changed direction toward the west and reascended. The Israelis knew that a civilian pilot's first priority is the safety of the passengers, so determined that the plane must have a good reason to avoid landing at any price. They inspected the plane more closely and saw that the blinds were drawn on all the windows, and the Israelis became more convinced that the plane should be prevented from escaping. At 1408, the Israeli fighter pilots received the order to force the plane to land by firing on the edge of the wings. The airliner continued westward. No communication on the international and Cairo Airport air traffic channels referred to the airliner. At 1410, the fighters fired at the base of the wing. The airliner started to descend to land on the nearby flat sandy area, failed to land safely, and crashed, killing 110 of the 116 passengers and crew members on board.

     From the Libyan Airliner's Perspective: Despite accusations of this being an intentional act that persist even today, analysis of the black box communications in the cockpit reveal an almost unbelievable explanation to the incident. There were three crew members in the cockpit: a French captain in the left front seat, a Libyan co-pilot in the right front seat, and a French flight engineer, sitting behind the captain. The captain and engineer were conversing in French, which the co-pilot could not easily understand, and drinking wine, and had not the slightest idea that they had deviated more than 70 miles from the planned route to Cairo International Airport. Although there was unexpected data regarding position and not receiving the Cairo non-directional beacon, they believed that they were approaching the Cairo airport. As such, they thought the fighter planes were Egyptian and not Israeli. The communications between the fighter pilot and the person that they thought was the pilot was actually the co-pilot, who had difficulty communicating because of language difficulties and was overridden. The crew interpreted the fighters' actions as a warning that they had overshot their airport and were over the Egyptian military base and were to be escorted back. When they were landing, they suddenly realized it was a military base, and decided to turn toward the other nearby civilian airport instead, which was their destination. They did not understand why they were being shot at by what they thought were Egyptian fighters and became panic-stricken. Suddenly, the Libyan co-pilot identified the fighters as Israeli, but it was too late. In the final tragic landing, they were completely out of control with devastating results.